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Omissions: Responsibility, Agency, and Metaphysics, by Randolph Clarke. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. $ 49.95 (hardcover).
SAMUEL MURRAY, University of Notre Dame1
Randolph Clarke’s book Omissions investigates three questions: “What 
kind of thing is an omission (or instance of refraining)? What is it to in-
tentionally omit (or refrain)? When is someone morally responsible for 
an omission (or instance of refraining)?” (2–3) The ultimate aim is to shed 
light on an “interesting facet of our agency” (1) and to make “significant 
progress in understanding human agency” (3). Clarke is certainly right 
that what we omit to do is often just as important or interesting as what 
we successfully do. Clarke aims to highlight these areas of importance 
and interest in a manner both sweeping and terse. In the following review 
I will provide a brief outline of the major conclusions of each chapter and 
then assess the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments therein.
The book divides, roughly, into four parts. The first part (chapters 1 
and 2) deals with the metaphysics of omissions. Chapter 1 argues that no 
theory of omissions that attempts to identify or link every omission to a 
positive doing or “commission” succeeds. A number of action theorists try 
to explain what an omission is by appealing to a prior commission of the 
agent. While Clarke agrees that these theories successfully explain certain 
cases of omission, they also fail to be fully general. One example where 
such a theory would fail goes like this. Suppose you promise to buy milk 
on your way home from work. While driving home, your mind wanders 
and you forget your promise. You drive right past the store, all the way 
home, with no milk. You omit to buy the milk. But what is the omission? 
There’s no commission of yours that is identical to your omitting to buy 
milk. Clarke thinks that this counter-example undermines the generality 
of such theories (16, 21, 28).
Clarke’s dissatisfaction with current theories of omissions leads, in 
chapter 2, to the claim that most omissions are “absences.” That is, many 
times when one omits there is nothing that is one’s omission (35). Thus, 
in those instances when one’s omission is not equivalent or connected in 
some sense to a corresponding action (as in cases of intentional omission), 
Clarke thinks that the omission is nothing at all. This, of course, has puz-
zling consequences. One can talk sensibly about omissions; some omis-
sions seem to be causes; one can omit for certain reasons; and, sometimes, 
people are morally responsible for their omissions. How can this be the 
1Thanks to Fritz Warfield, Paul Blaschko, Tobias Flattery, Jeff Snapper, Louise Williams, 
Emily Spencer, Graham Clay, Ting Cho Lau, Jeff Tolly, Mike Murray, and especially Randy 
Clarke for discussion while I was writing this review.




case if an omission is literally nothing? Clarke addresses the linguistic and 
causal problems related to some of these concerns in chapter 2 and leaves 
the other issues for later chapters.
The second part (chapter 3) offers an account of what it is to inten-
tionally omit. Clarke identifies some necessary conditions on intentional 
omissions while denying that other conditions are necessary. Deciding 
to omit to A is not a necessary condition on intentionally omitting to A. 
Actively intending to omit to A (i.e., forming an intention to omit to A) 
is not a necessary condition, either. For Clarke, to intentionally omit to A 
one must minimally come to have a relevant intention not to A and that 
intention must play some causal role in the agent’s omitting to A (63). This 
differs from other theories of intentional omission that claim that inten-
tionally omitting requires some active contribution (like making a decision 
or forming an intention) on the part of the agent. Thus, on Clarke’s view, 
intentional omissions are not necessarily actions of some sort (64). The 
rest of chapter 3 discusses the role of reasons and the place of intentional 
omissions in human agency.
The third part (chapters 4–7) investigates moral responsibility for omis-
sions. Here things get a bit more complicated and a bit more speculative. 
Chapter 4 looks at what sort of abilities one needs in order to omit. Clarke 
offers the following. In order to omit to A (where A names a description 
of some behavior), an agent must (a) possess some ability to A; (b) have 
the opportunity to A; (c) be free in omitting to A (though Clarke denies 
that omitting requires the kind of freedom that depends on the presence 
of some sort of indeterminism [92]). Generally, one will be under an ob-
ligation or norm to perform the action that one omits, though this is not 
a necessary condition on omitting. As Clarke puts it:, “one seldom if ever 
counts as having omitted to do something unless there was some norm, 
standard, or ideal that called for one’s so acting” (29).
Clarke also rejects that one must possess a disposition to believe that 
one has the ability or the opportunity to perform the omitted action. Dis-
cussing the case of a novice chess player who fails to castle at an opportune 
moment, Clarke claims that “if the novice chess player omits to castle, it 
appears that one needn’t be disposed to have any belief about one’s ability 
to do what one omits, nor about having an opportunity to do it” (94).
In chapter 5 Clarke discusses the conditions under which one is directly 
morally responsible for one’s omissions. There, Clarke proposes that an 
agent is directly morally responsible for omitting to A on some occasion just 
in case she freely omits to A then (116). One freely omits to A when one has 
(a) the ability to A, (b) the opportunity to A, (c) one freely decides not to A or 
is free in nonactively coming to have an intention not to A or is free in B-ing 
where B-ing precludes A-ing, and (d) one is aware at some time that one is 
omitting or will omit to A (117–118; this last condition will not apply in the 
case of free unwitting omissions, which case Clarke discusses in chapter 7). 
Clarke suggests that the proposal probably needs to be “fleshed out” to fit 
with some antecedent theory of freedom and causation (118, 134).
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Chapter 6 examines whether moral responsibility for one’s omitting to 
A requires the ability to A. Clarke tries to construct a Frankfurt-style case 
where some agent is culpable for omitting to A despite being unable to A. 
If successful, the case would show that culpability does not always require 
a corresponding ability. Of all the chapters, Clarke is at his most hesitant 
here and conjectures more than he concludes. Chapter 7 tackles the tricky 
topic of culpability for unwitting omissions. For Clarke, an unwitting 
omission to A is one where the agent lacks awareness of her failure to A. 
Clarke thinks that we can be directly morally responsible even for such 
omissions. He offers the following sufficient condition on culpability for 
unwitting omissions:
Provided that the agent has the capacities that make her a morally respon-
sible agent, she is blameworthy for such an [unwitting] omission if she is 
free in failing to doing [sic] the thing in question and if her lack of awareness 
of her obligation to do it—and of the fact that she isn’t doing it—falls below 
a cognitive standard that applies to her, given her cognitive and volitional 
abilities and the situation she is in. (167)
I will return to this position in my critical remarks below.
The fourth part of the book (chapters 8 and 9) applies some of Clarke’s 
observations about omissions to legal and applied ethical issues. Chapter 
8 argues that the distinction between doing and allowing does not overlap 
exactly with the distinction between action and omission (184). Chapter 9 
looks at omissions in the context of the criminal law and uses the account 
of culpability for unwitting omissions developed in chapter 7 to ground 
criminal liability for negligence (197–198).
A book like Clarke’s is sorely needed. He is correct when he says that 
“There’s been only piecemeal philosophical treatment of omitting and 
refraining” (2). Thus, it is time for someone to pull the various strands 
together. While Clarke makes an important contribution to this task there 
are still some lingering issues that need to be addressed.
Before I make any critical remarks, I want to note that this book has a 
number of virtues. Clarke displays a keen awareness of which issues need 
further treatment, and some of the specific treatments of particular topics 
are extremely valuable (e.g., the discussion of the semantics of sentences 
that refer to absences [48–49] is, I think, Clarke at his best). He also does 
an excellent job noting the various problems with certain theoretical posi-
tions. In that sense, Clarke provides a great map of where not to go with 
one’s theory of omission.
A great map of where not to go, however, is not always a great map 
of where to go. Clarke’s book draws many conclusions, two of which are 
especially ambitious. The first is that most omissions are absences in the 
sense that for most omissions there is nothing that is “the omission”; the 
second is that we can be basically morally responsible for unwitting omis-
sions. Clarke does not, however, provide enough material to support ei-
ther of these rather large claims.
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Clarke aims to support the first claim by eliminating all views that try 
to identify an ontological kind to which omissions might belong. How-
ever, many of Clarke’s arguments against these competitor positions are 
inadequate or incomplete. Consider one example. Clarke considers the 
view that omissions belong to the ontological kind of “negative facts” 
(38–39). Clarke’s criticism of this view amounts to the following syllogism:
(1) Omissions are absences
(2) All facts are truthbearers
(3) No absence is a truthbearer
(4) No absence is a fact
(5) No fact is an omission
It’s not clear that proponents of the “negative facts” view would accept 
(1). Instead, they would claim that omissions are just certain ways of char-
acterizing some bit of behavior.2 Take the milk example from earlier. On 
a negative facts view, what is the omission in the example? The behavior 
of the agent makes true the sentence “It is not the case that Agent buys 
milk.” The omission just is that particular way of describing the behavior. 
Omissions are a semantic, rather than ontological, phenomenon. Thus, 
anyone who claims that an omission is a negative fact will also claim that 
omissions are not absences. Clarke would need to show that this view is 
either inconsistent or disturbs reflective equilibrium in some way. Absent 
this sort of treatment, I do not see why the negative facts view is more 
implausible than Clarke’s “absences” view of omissions.
Clarke tries to get his second big claim by offering culpability condi-
tions on basic moral responsibility for unwitting omissions (found in the 
passage that I reproduced above). I have two concerns with this. First, 
Clarke merely states that some agent is morally responsible (and, more 
specifically, culpable) for an unwitting omission when that agent freely 
omits and the agent’s level of awareness of relevant practical and norma-
tive facts that bear on the agent’s circumstances is substandard. But all 
this tells us is that there’s a line between culpable unwitting omissions 
and blameless unwitting omissions marked by a cognitive standard; no 
indication is given as to where or how to draw the relevant demarcating 
line or what the line is (what is a “cognitive standard,” for example?). The 
second problem is that it presumes that all unwitting omissions are alike. 
Even if that is ultimately correct, it is not a point that one should presume. 
For example, is omitting to buy milk the same sort of omission as omitting 
to see a certain moral reason for acting? Is omitting to remove one’s child 
from the hot car the same sort of omission as omitting to reflect on one’s 
patterns of behavior toward members of the opposite gender? The lurking 
danger is that if all unwitting omissions are not alike, then we might need 
2See, for instance: Jonathan Bennett, Events and Their Names (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), 
218–221; Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 85–92.
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to develop distinct cognitive standards to explain one’s culpability for 
different kinds of unwitting omissions. It might be the case that Clarke’s 
proposal applies equally to these cases, though that is a substantive point 
that remains to be shown.
In addition to this, there is little discussion of some literature that, while 
not directly on the topic of omissions, overlaps with certain features of 
Clarke’s account in significant ways. Relevant material by George Sher, 
Nomy Arpaly, Neil Levy, and Manuel Vargas receive little or no treatment 
here (and Angela Smith’s influential position on responsibility for atti-
tudes receives only superficial attention).3 Of course, one cannot discuss 
everything in one book, but I was disappointed to see that Sher’s recent 
(and magnificent) book was discussed nowhere in the main text.
When Clarke does engage the views of others in this space the criti-
cal remarks are often not fully persuasive. Both Michael Zimmerman4 
and Gideon Rosen5 argue (independently of one another) that the lack of 
awareness characteristic of unwitting omissions implies lack of control 
over behavior that results from an unwitting omission; hence, in most 
cases of unwitting omission the agent will not be morally responsible for 
the omission because, in some sense, the agent lacks the relevant control 
needed to be morally responsible. Clarke says that lack of awareness does 
not imply lack of control, and hence lack of awareness need not excuse as 
long as the lack of awareness is substandard (culpable), as measured by 
the aforementioned cognitive standard. Even if we grant that the “cogni-
tive standard” view that Clarke proposes has enough content to support 
this response, it is not clear to me that this blocks either Zimmerman’s 
or Rosen’s argument. Clarke would need to say more on the conditions 
that govern the application of the standard to agents in various morally 
significant contexts. If we cannot fix the reference of the standard without 
appealing to epistemic states of the agent or the epistemic norms that 
govern our epistemic practices, then Zimmerman’s and Rosen’s argu-
ments would still go through because we would need to appeal, in some 
sense, to the agent’s awareness in order to determine whether the agent 
is culpable.
This book is written for professional philosophers with a working 
knowledge of metaphysics, action theory, and ethics. Those that have little 
3Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003); Neil Levy, “The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy,” Journal of Ethics 
and Social Philosophy 1 (2005): 1–16; George Sher, Who Knew: Responsibility without Awareness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activ-
ity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (2005): 236–271; Manuel Vargas, “The Trouble 
with Tracing,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005): 269–291.
4Michael Zimmerman, “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance,” Ethics 107 (1997): 410–426; 
Michael Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
5Gideon Rosen, “Culpability and Ignorance,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 
(2003): 61–84; Gideon Rosen, “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility,” in Philosophical Per-
spectives 18 (2004): 295–313.
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or no prior experience with any of these (particularly metaphysics and 
action theory) will, I think, have a hard time making it through this book.
This will not be the last book on omissions. While Clarke does an admi-
rable job laying out the broad outlines of various debates pertaining to omis-
sions and offers a wide variety of interesting examples to chew on, it does 
not deliver a full-orbed, positive theory of omissions. Perhaps, however, 
this is the most that we can (and should) expect from a book that tries to 
make a substantive contribution to a largely disorganized field of research.
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Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Account, Volumes 1 and 2, 
by Craig S. Keener. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011. Pp. 1210. 
$ 65.00 (hardback).
JOHANNES GRÖSSL, University of Siegen
In his two-volume magnum opus, Miracles, Biblical scholar Craig Keener 
engages in a philosophical analysis of the reliability of miracle claims. Al-
though the book’s subtitle and the author’s specialization might suggest 
an exegetical focus, the two central themes of the book are scrutinizing 
and critiquing David Hume’s anti-supernaturalism and presenting an as-
tonishing collection of eyewitness claims of miracles in antiquity as well 
as in the modern era. For this review I will concentrate on his philosophi-
cal argumentation.
Keener’s main interest in writing a book on miracles is “challenging 
the Western anti-supernaturalist readings of the Gospels and Acts” (2). He 
realizes that this challenge cannot be undertaken without taking into ac-
count non-Biblical miracle claims in order to maintain coherent rationality 
criteria for historiography. Keener names his two central theses right at 
the beginning: “eyewitnesses do offer miracle claims” and “supernatural 
explanations . . . should be welcome on the scholarly table along with other 
explanations often discussed” (1). Keener’s second thesis is thus rather 
weak: Instead of arguing for “supernatural theism,” he merely claims that 
it should not be ruled out a priori (8): “[I]f one presupposes neither theism 
nor nontheism, one must examine evidence for particular miracle claims 
inductively to see if a pattern emerges” (161).
In the first part of the book, Keener presents early Christian evidence 
for miracle claims (21–34) and miracle claims outside Christianity (35–65), 
afterwards comparing both sides (66–83), most notably Early Christian 
and Jewish miracle accounts (71–72). Here, Keener evaluates the genre 
question as critical: while miracles are often presented “to make a homiletic 
point concerning a teaching,” New Testament miracles intend to “validate 
